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MAXINE D. LIND,SAY,
A. P'P elloot,

-vs.ECCLES HO·TEL COMPANY, a corporation, doing business under the
trade name and style of Hotel Ben
Lomond,
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IN THE SUPREME COUR.T
of the

S'TATE OF UTAH
MAXINE D. LIND·SAY,

Appellant,
-vs.ECCLES HO·TEL COMPANY, ·a corporation, doing business under the
trade name and style of Hotel Ben
Lomond,

Respondent.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

ADDITIONAL STATEMENT OF F'ACTS
Respondent deems it advisable to enlarge so1newhat
on the Statement of Facts set forth in Appellant's Brief.
The Coffee Shop in question is located south of and adjacent to the Lobby of the I-Iotel Ben IJomond. There is
an entrance from the street and also an entrance from the
Lobby of the Hotel. In the west half of the Coffee Shop
there is a counter with revolving stools and the waitresses serve the patrons water from a fountain back of this
counter (Tr. 47).
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In the rear or east half of the Coffee Shop proper
are two rows of tables large enough to accommodate
four people to a table. There \Vas no booths and the
tables were siltuated against each wall, with sufficient
roo1n ~between to allow for two chairs on each side. 'l1he
tables on the north side extended back to the rear wall.
The tables on the south side did not extend back to the
rear wall. ·The space thereby left open was where the
waitresses obtained water to serve the customers at the
tables. There was an aisle approximately four feet wide
reserved between the rows of tables which lead to the
kitchen at the rear. Entrance to the kitchen was made
through two swinging doors at the end of the aisle.
For convenience in operation one waitress was assigned to take care of the customers at the counter; one
waitress took c.are of the customers a.t the tables on the
south side and a third waitress took care of the customers at the taJbles on the north side.
There was constructed at the rear, on the south side,
where no table was placed, a water founltain which consisted of a curved neck. This fountain was used by the
two waitresses at the tables. When customers were
seated, the waitress went to this fountain, obtained
glasses and placed ice therein and 'then filled them with
water to within a inch of the top, and placed them on the
table for use by the customers. Thereafter ~the glasses
were never touched by the waitresses until after the
patron had finished their meals. If additional water was
needed during the course of the meal, the waitress filled
the glasses fro1n a pitcher at the tahle.
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On the 22nd of J'une, 1948 appellant and a friend entered the Coffee Shop and were seated by the hostess,
Mrs. McGahy, at or near the rear table on the south side.
Appellant took a seat near the south wall, that is the seat
fartherest from the aisle. Her companion took her seat
on the oppos~te side of the table in the same position.
(See Plaintiff's Dep. 3 and 4; also, Mr. West's testimony,
23; and Miss Wahlstrom's testimony, 49.) That left the
spaces neareslt to the aisle unoccupied. Irene Wahlstrom
was the waitress assigned to serve then1. She testified
in behalf of the defendant ( Tr. 38 to 65). She stated positively that she did not touch the glasses after they were
placed by her on the table (Tr. 4G); that she did not spill
any water on the floor (Tr. 47); that she did not see any
water on the floor; and that she walked up and down the
aisle from the kitchen to the table she was serving. She
further testified that the floor was cleaned every evening
after closing hours; that it had never been waxed to her
knowledge (Tr. 51); that during the three years that she
had worked there, she never knew of any one slipping
on the floor. The floor was covered with \vhat is known
as Ceramic tile; it had never been replaced or changed
since the hotel was constructed in about 1928. There wa~
no evidence or no contention that the floor was worn or
rendered in any way unsafe because of wear.
1

Mr. Garrison, who has been in the floor covering
business for twenty years, testified that Ceramic tile is
slippery when wet. He admitted, however, that Cerarnie
tile is in constant use in showers, entrance ways, lavatories. In fact, he admitted on eross exatnination that
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Ceramic tile was placed in the lavatories in the ne\v Ci't~·
and County Building here in Ogden and that it is being
used in new buildings in Ogden and i~ a type conRtantly
and universally used ( Tt. 13).
Mrs. McGahy, the hostess, whose deposition was offered by the plaintiff, testified that this floor was alwayB
kept clean, that the manage1nent was very particular
about that; that there was no polish on the floor. When
asked sp·ecifically if she had ever slipped on the floor,
she answered "well, sometin1es, when I was behind the
counter or something like that. I had maybe slipped a
little bit but never had I fallen or anything like that.
We were particular. We tried to keep that so this thing
wouldn't happ~en." (Dep. 7 and 8)
It is to be noted that she stated that she might have
slipp·ed while behind the counter but there is no evidence
that any waitress or customer ever slipped while using
or walking upon the places reserved for use by customers
or waitresses. All of the evidence which has been presented to this court states very definitely that plaintiff
fell as she arose from her chair so that it is fairly well
established that she did not slip in the aisle at all but
rather slipped when she was still in the area occupied by
the tables.
We think this evidence very important because it is
established thalt if there was any water on the floor, it
was at or near the place where the plaintiff was seated
and the water could have been spilled, if there was any
\Vater so Rpillerl, by the plaint~ff herself while seated at
4
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the table as she admit ted that she used the glass and
drank water during the course of her meal. If any water
was in fact spilled on the floor it was a very s1nall
amount.
1

At the conclusion of plaintiff's case, defendant
moved for dismissal which vvas overruled. Defendant then
offered its evidence and both sides reslted. Defendant
again moved the court for a dismissal of the action. The
court, in accordance with the new rules, took this Motion
under advisement and submitted the ease to the jury (Tr.
006). The jury were unable to agree on a verdict and
were discharged ( Tr. 007).
Thereafter defendant filed its Motion for Judgment
notwithstanding the discharge of the jury as provided by
Rule 41 (2) B, and the court granted the motion (Tr.
010).
Thereafter plain tiff filed a Motion to reconsider
and set aside the ruling of the court or, in the alternative,
to grant a new trial. This Motion was based solely upon
the affidavit of one Eleanor McFarlane Evertsen (Tr.
011).
Thereaflter the court entered a minute entry denying
said Motion (Tr. 012).
ARGUMENT
We shall endeavor to answer briefly and in order
the Statement of Points set forth on page 6 of Plaintiff's
Brief.
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POINT 1.
ERROR OF THE COURT IN GRANTING DEFENDANT'S
MOTION FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE DISCHARGE OF THE JURY.

Counsel for Appellant
Court in the case of,

relie~

upon the decision of thi:-;

Ericksen v. Walgr.een Dru.g Co., ______ TTL ------,
232 P. (2d) 210.
A rnere reading of this will disclose that the fact~
are so dissitnilar that it seeu1s to us that the ('aHe is of
little or no assistance.
The Walgreen case involved an entirely different
situaation. r_rhere the tile in quesltion was under an open
canopy leading fron1 the sidewalk to the main entrance
of the building. The tile had become worn and had lost
1nuch of its character designed to prevent slipping. The
accident occurred on a rainy day when this area was
con1pletely vvet. It 'vas also sloping so as to render the
s~une unsafe.
In this case the accident happened on the 22nd day
of June, 1948. The weather was dry. Counsel contend
that defendant was negligent ·because it did not place
1na ts in the aisle. There are two answers to this charge:
:B-,irs t, there is no evidence that the aisle was slippery and
second the evidence is that the plaintiff slipped near
where she 'vas sitting and not in the aisle at all. It is of
course axiomatic that the defendant is not an insurer of
the safety of its guests. It is only required to exercise
reasonable care to see that the premises are reasonably
1

6
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safe. Had the accident occurred during stormy weather
and had it appeared that customers entering the building
brought in water on their shoes or cldthes which fell on
the floor, thereby making it slippery, as in the Walgreen
case, a different situation might present itself but here
the defendant was extra cautious in not allowing or permitting the floor to become wet and there is no contention
that the floor was slippery or dangerous when wet.
Respondent relies principally upon the case of,

Jens.en v. Kress, 49 P. (2d) 958, 87 Utah 434.
We assert with full confidence that this case is on all
fours with the case in question. Mr. Justice Wolfe, in
writing the opinion of the court, says :
"There was no evidence as to how the glass
got cracked or how long it had been cracked before the plaintiff was cut by it.
"Again, in both cases (ref. to the Quinn case)
the cause of the spilled ink or broken glass may
have been caused by the customer who vvas danlaged or by another customer, or rnay have been
caused by some representative of the company
wit.hout negligence and witho·ut negligence and
unnoticed when it was done.
"Again, in the instant case it was just as consistent that the plaintiff herself or son1e other
customer had leaned against the show case and
thus split off a piece of glass as if the defendant
had done it negligently."
Again, in commenting on the case of Ober ·o. The
Golden Rule, Mr. Justice Wolfe says:

7
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·r91U n9vr ~tfLI'he ;e~eiw.dulft,berp:arollelito the instant case
·\) rriLilht~~!f9~·}?Jir~P.9.}V)l that the con1pany broke this
7ro H~l~~~~ Pi::skne~ it to be in s~ch condition and allowed ~1i! to rema1n so. Then 1n each case there would
'be an act or omission attributable to the company.
Under the evidence of this case the breaking 1nay
or may not be attributable to the co1npany.''

In this case there is no evidence before this court
as to
(a.)

Who spilled the water.

It is just as consistent to assume that the plaintiff
spilled the water as it is to a.ssu1ne that some employee
of the company spilled it. After the glass of water was
placed on her table, no agent or employee of the defendant ever touched the glass. But, on the contrary, the
plaintiff drank from the glass during the course of the
meal. And
(b) There is no evidence as to how long the water
re1nained on the floor.
The evidence is conclusive that there was no water
on the floor when the plaintiff was seated at the table
not 1nore than one-half hour before the accident. If there
'vas 'vater on the floor, it may have been placed there
within minutes or seconds before the plaintiff slipped.
And, assuming, for the sake of argument, that a waitress
accidentally did in fact spill the water, there is no evidence that the wai tess knew that she had in fact spilled
any water and if such was the case, the spilling of the
water by a waitress would not be negligence.

8
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Again, reverting to Mr. Justice Wolfe's statement:
"'or rnay have been caused by some representative of the
co1npany vvithout negligence and unnoticed when it was
done," if such vvas the case, then the defendant would
not be liable in the absence of evidence showing that the
\Vater had been on the floor for a sufficient length of time
to have constituted notice and an opportunity to remedy
the situation.
The Jensen case has been cited with approval by
1nany courts and it has never been modified or in any
1nanner ·criticized by this court.
It is proba~bly unnecessary to cite cases from other
jurisdictions. We might however cite the following cases
which are in harmony with the Jensen case:

Rossburg v. M ont.gomery Ward & Co.,
99 P. (2d) 979;

(~lont.)

Crawford v. Pac. State Sav. & Laan Co. (Cal.) 71
Pac. (2d) 333;
Zampor v. U.S. Smelt. & Refiln. Co. (lOth Circuit)
206 F. (2d) 171.
While not directly in point, yet we think the case of,

Jordan v Coca Cola Bottling Co., 117 Utah 578,
218 Pac. ( 2d) 660.
also sustains our position. In this case and the recent
case of,

Devine v. Cook, ______ Utah------, 279 Pac. (2d) 1073.
both interesting cases involving the law of negligence
and especially its causes, that if several inferences may
9
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be deduced from the evidence, one of which inferenceR
may support a conclusion of negligence but the other
inference would not support n~ligence, then the court
cannot permit the jury to speculate on the question o!'
negligence.
In our case we re-assert what was stated in the Coca
Cola case· and in the Devine case that it is just as consistent that the water was spilled, if there was any water
spilled on the floor, by some one else as it is to conclude
that it was knowingly spilled by a waitress. Therefore,
the jury could not speculate on this question.
We assert therefore that the court was clearly right
when he granted defendant's Motion for Judgment notwithstanding the Discharge of the jury.
POINT 2.
THAT THE GRANTING OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION
WAS ·CONTRARY TO LAW.

We have fully covered this matter in our discussion
under Point 1.
POINT 3.
REFUSAL OF THE COURT TO ADMIT IN EVIDENCE
THE SWORN AFFIDAVIT OF LILLIAN McGARY, "EXHIBIT
ONE" OF THE DEPOSITION OF LILLIAN McGARY, AND
IN STRIKING PARTS OF THE DEPOSITION FROM THE
EVIDENCE.

Counsel for plaintiff assert that the witness Lillian
McGahy was an adverse witness. We contend that there
is absolutely no evidence in this record on appeal from
10
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\vhich such a conclusion could be assumed. True, the
record sho\vs that she \Vas ordered by subpoena to testify
but the fact of being adverse can not be inferred frorn
this fact but quite apart frorn that, the affidavit wa~
elearly hearsay evidence. It \vas not rendered under conditions \\'hich \Vould perrnit its declarations to be a part
of the res gestae.
Counsel frankly adrnit that their associate counsel
vvho took the deposition did not attempt to lay any foundation for irnpeachrnent nor did he lay any foundation to
shovv that the waitress vvas in any manner hostile. Counsel say ··she had becorne a hostile \Vitness. She not only
refused to return to Utah to testify but refused to appear
for the purpose of taking her deposition until compelled
to do so.'' 1~here is no evidence in this record that she
refused to return to Utah to testify nor is there any evidence that she refused to appear for the purpose of taking her deposition until compelled to do so but if she did,
that did not prove her a hostile \vitness. Counsel admit
that they can find no authority to sustain their position
that the court erred in not allowing the affidavit to be
introduced in evidence. And in passing it rnust be noted
that the offer of the affidavit was not made for the purpose of impeaclnnent but it is contended by counsel that
the statements contained in the affidavit should havf"
been submitted as evidence from which the jury could
find negligence. Clearly, as stated by the court in the
J(ress v. tT en sen case, declarations of an agent, rnade long
after the happening of the event, are not adrnissihle
against the principal in the absence of a showing that the

11
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agent had authority to bind the principal. We pass this
1natter without further com1nent.

POINT 4.
REFUSAL OF THE COURT TO GRANT PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION TO RECONSIDER AND SET ASIDE DEFENDANT'S "MOTION FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING
DISCHARGE OF THE JURY"; AND TO IMPANEL A NEW
JURY AND SET CASE FOR TRIAL; OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL.

Counsel boldy state appellant's i\1otion for new Trial
was based primarily upon the supporting affidavit of
one Eleanor McFarlane Evertsen and should have been
granted on the theory that it was newly discovered evidence, material for the party making the application
which he could not with reasonable diligence ha~ve discovered and produoed at the trial. (See pages 10 and 11
of Appellant's Brief.)
They further state, on page 11, counsel spent time
and effort in trying to locate a Mrs. Davidson but naturally were unsuccessful when the true name of the
witness was made known to appellants' attorney they
undertook to find her and finally located her in Salt Lake
City, By that time the jury had been called, the trial date
definitely fixed and the trial about to begin. Counsel
talked to her husband by telephone during each of the
two days immediately preceding the trial and were informed by her husband that she was ill in bed and could
not possibly ap·pear."

12
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We submit that this statement by counsel is wholly
outside the record; that there is no evidence presented
to this· court to support the foregoing statement.
Counsel further state the ''court had previously
emphatically stated that there would be no more continuances of the case and that it would either be tried or
dismissed on that date so that counsel did not feel justified in asking for another continuance and thereby incurring the ill will of the court, particularly when counsel
did not know whether the testunony of Mrs. Evertsen
would be material or Inerely cumulative. Moreover, to
have made a motion for a further continuance would have
been a futile thing and such a 1notion would have been
denied by the trial court. He had expressed definite
impatience in that no more continuances would have been
granted and would not have called off the jury at that
late date. Of this counsel for appellant was then and
are now convinced." (Pages 11 and 12, Tr.)
Again, we must remind this court that there is not
a scintilla of evidence, transcribed or presented to this
court to sustain this state1nent. It is however interesting
to note that this case was filed on the 8th day of June,
1949 and that it was not tried until the 7th of May, 1954,
or practically five years after the filing of the co1nplaint.
On the question of diligence, it is further interestin~
to note:
That plaintiff's counsel failed to explain what diligence was undertaken during this whole five year period
to find this witness who adn1ittedly was a friend of the

13
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plaintiff and it is further interesting not note how quickly, after the granting of this 1notion, plaintiff's counsel
were able to locate this witness in Salt Lake City. They
admit that this was not newly discovered evidence, that
they learned of this witness at least two days before trial
but they say they did not know whether her evidence
was cumulative or not. What kind of diligence is that1
Then they say that the court had announced that
he would grant no further continuances. We have already
alluded to the fact that there is no evidence in this record
which supports this statement but even if it is true, it
seems to us that counsel for plaintiff not only lacked
diligence but were guilty of the grossest kind of negligence in not calling the rna tter to the attention of the
trial court.
Even assuming that the trial court had been impatient because of repeated continuances, yet, it seen1s to
us, that counsel was certainly derelict in not asking for
a continuance and to impute to the trial court that he
would not have listened to their plea had they made a
p.rop~er. showing is to impute to the trial judge motives
quite contrary to our experience with the fine judges of
the State of Utah.
Counsel admit that this court can not review the
action of the trial court in granting or denying a motion
for a new trial except only upon a showing of an abuse
of discretion. It seems rather difficult to claim or even
assert, under the facts of this case, tha·t the trial court
\vas guilty of an abuse of discretion reviewable by this
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court in denying their motion, when counsel admit that
for at least two days prior to the date of trial they kne'v
of this witness and had apparently made no effort to
interview her and certainly never called the matter to the
attention of the trial court at a time "\vhen they should
have done so but chose to rely upon the trial of the case
without this testi1nony, hoping to use it as a means of
obtaining a second trial should the verdict be rendered
against them. This certainly is not the diligence which
is required to support a rnotion for a new trial and certainly the denial of the n1otion did not constitute an
abuse of discretion.
Respondent contends that the motion for judgment
was properly granted and that the denial of the motion
for a new trial was properly overruled.
Respectfully submitted,

LEROY B. YOUNG
of YouNG,

THATCHER

Attorneys for

&

GLASMANN

Respor~Adent

1ri
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